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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law in the United States involves “recognizing an intellectual
property [right,] created and acquired by use. Government registration in the
[United States] is essentially recognition of a right already acquired by use . . . .
[R]egistration in the [United States] does not create the trademark.”1 Therefore,
“[u]se of a designation as a trademark in the marketplace does two things: (1)

*J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, Marquette University Law School.
1. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
19:1.75 (5th ed. 2019); see also JBLU, Inc. v. United States, 813 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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it creates common law rights under state law; and (2) under federal law, it
creates a basis for federal registration.”2 Converse and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “Federal Circuit”) put this principle of
trademark law to the test in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.3
The Federal Circuit devotes two sentences,4 and includes four citations to other
sources of authority,5 to whether there is a distinction between an unregistered,
common-law trademark (“common-law trademark”) and a federally registered
trademark (“federal trademark”).6 However, this brief discussion serves as the
jumping-off point for the rest of the Federal Circuit’s opinion.
This Comment analyzes which trademark model (the pyramid model or the
box model) is a better representation and characterization of trademarks and
trademark rights. Under the pyramid model, there is one trademark: both
common law rights and federal registration rights attach to this single
trademark. For the pyramid model, trademark rights resemble a pyramid
because federal registration rights build upon the foundation created by
common law rights. Common law rights and federal registration rights are
interdependent. Under the box model, there is a common-law trademark and a
federal trademark: common law rights attach to the common-law trademark,
and federal registration rights attach to the federal trademark. For the box
model, trademark rights resemble two separate boxes because the first box
contains common law rights, and the second box contains federal registration
rights. Common law rights are independent of federal registration rights.
In Part I, this Comment provides a brief overview of trademark law and
explains the basic principles of trademark law in the context of the pyramid
model and the box model. Part II explains the procedural history of Converse,
Inc. v. International Trade Commission before the International Trade
Commission (the “ITC”). Part II also outlines the Federal Circuit opinion for
Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission. In Part III, this Comment
summarizes an earlier Federal Circuit opinion and an earlier Supreme Court
opinion, focusing on which trademark model was applied in each case. Part IV
2. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:8.
3. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
4. Id. at 1115. “In addressing these issues, we think that it is confusing and inaccurate to refer
to two separate [trade]marks—a [federal] [trade]mark and a common-law [trade]mark. Rather, there
is a single [trade]mark, as to which different rights attach from the common law and from federal
registration.” Id.
5. Id. at 1115–16. The four sources cited include case law and the leading treatise on
trademarks: (1) In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999); (2) In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961); (3) 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:3 (5th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2018); and (4) Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). Id.
6. See id. at 1115.
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discusses whether the Federal Circuit correctly applied its chosen trademark
model. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit, in Converse,
Inc v. International Trade Commission, got it right; trademarks should be
viewed in the context of the pyramid model.
I.

OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARKS: PYRAMID OF RIGHTS VS. BOXES OF
RIGHTS

The two different trademark models—the pyramid model and the box
model—demonstrate a conflict in trademark law: how should trademarks and
trademark rights be represented and characterized? The pyramid model
recognizes the existence of only one trademark and views the rights conferred
by trademark law as a pyramid with two levels. Although there is a single main
trademark, the two levels of the pyramid represent sub-trademarks. Level 1
represents the common-law trademark portion of the trademark—which, in
other words, is the trademark with common law rights attached. Level 1
consists of common law rights. If applicable, Level 2 represents the federal
trademark portion of the trademark—which, in other words, is the trademark
with federal registration rights attached. Level 2 contains federal registration
rights. Level 1 and Level 2 build upon one another. Under the pyramid model,
a trademark owner has two options: (1) a trademark owner can have only Level
1; or (2) a trademark owner can have both Level 1 and Level 2. Level 1 can
exist without Level 2, but Level 2 cannot exist without Level 1.
The box model recognizes the existence of two separate trademarks (a
common-law trademark and a federal trademark) and views the rights conferred
by trademark law as two separate boxes. Box 1 contains the common-law
trademark and common law rights, and Box 2 contains the federal trademark
and federal registration rights. Box 1 and Box 2 are independent of one another.
Under the box model, a trademark owner has three options: (1) a trademark
owner can have both Box 1 and Box 2; (2) a trademark owner can have only
Box 1; or (3) a trademark owner can have only Box 2.
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Below are basic diagrams of the two trademark models:

Single
Trademark
Level 2
Federal
Trademark

Level 1
Common-Law Trademark

Figure 1: Pyramid Model

Box 1
CommonLaw
Trademark

Box 2
Federal
Trademark

Figure 2: Box Model

The same principles of trademark law support both the pyramid model and
the box model, but the interpretation of those principles highlights the
differences between the two trademark models. First, the trademark in the
pyramid model and the trademarks in the box model are established in the same
way, and both trademark models include the same fundamental right afforded
to trademark owners. The criteria for establishing a trademark right is not
complex: the trademark must be “use[d] in commerce.”7 Therefore, as the
Supreme Court has observed, the rule for establishing trademark ownership is
use, not federal registration.8 Moreover, contingent on the ability to
demonstrate validity, a trademark owner has “the right to prevent others from
trading on the goodwill established by the trademark by using the same or a
similar trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the source,
7. See Jonathan Hyman et al., If the IP Fits, Wear It: IP Protection for Footwear–A U.S.
Perspective, 108 TMR 645, 659 (2018).
8. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3.
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origin, or sponsorship of products.”9 Use in commerce establishes Level 1 of
the pyramid model and Box 1 and Box 2 of the box model, and both levels of
the pyramid model and boxes of the box model support the right outlined above;
however, that is where the similarities between the two trademark models end.
The differences between the pyramid model and the box model become
apparent through other principles of trademark law.
The pyramid model and the box model support the relationship between
common-law trademarks and federal trademarks in different ways. Trademark
rights acquired from federal registration “may be considered supplemental to
those recognized at common law, stemming from ownership of a trademark.”10
Federal registration does not eliminate common law rights.11 “When a
trademark is registered, common law rights continue: they are not erased by
federal registration.”12 The pyramid model views federal registration as
building upon common law rights, adding another level to the pyramid. The
box model views federal registration as adding another box that sits next to the
common law box. In addition, federal registration “provides significant
benefits and can make enforcement of the [trade]mark easier.”13 The scope of
protection for common-law trademarks is limited:
Without registration, trademark rights under the [United States]
common law system may be limited only to those geographic areas
where the [trade]mark is used. Additionally, when relying only on
common law rights, the trademark owner must prove that the
[trade]mark is valid and protectable in order to prevail in a claim of
trademark infringement.14
In comparison, the scope of protection for federal trademarks is broader:
A federal[] . . . [trade]mark is presumed to be a valid [trade]mark and
the registrant is presumed to have the exclusive right to use the
trademark throughout the United States on the goods or services listed
in the registration. Additionally, a registration constitutes constructive
notice to third parties of the registrant’s rights in the [trade]mark, is
readily revealed in trademark clearance searches conducted by others,

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Hyman et al., supra note 7, at 659.
In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (1970).
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3.
Id.
Hyman et al., supra note 7, at 659.
Id.
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can block confusingly similar [trade]marks from registering, and can
also be registered with Customs to help block the importation of
counterfeit goods. After five years, the registration may become
incontestable, which significantly limits the grounds on which
competitors can attack the registration.15
From the pyramid model perspective, the significant benefits of federal
registration add to the minimal benefits conferred by common law. From the
box model perspective, the significant benefits of federal registration are
separate from the minimal benefits conferred by common law.
Furthermore, the sources of trademark law can be interpreted to either
support the pyramid model or the box model. “Federal registration and state
common law rights emanate from separate government sources.”16 For
example, in terms of federal law, trademarks in the United States are primarily
governed by the Lanham Act.17 For the pyramid model, the separate sources
of law represent the two levels of the pyramid; the separate sources of law still
need to cooperate for the trademark system to function. In comparison, for the
box model, because multiple sources govern trademark law, it requires two
separate boxes; different sources of law mean different governing statutes,
different rights, and different remedies.
Finally, the ability to bring civil actions and the associated remedies
provided for under trademark law can be interpreted to either support the
pyramid model or the box model. A trademark owner can bring a civil action
under either state law or federal law.18 For trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act, the trademark owner can rely on 15 U.S.C. § 1114 for a federal
trademark or 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for a common-law trademark.19 A trademark
owner’s ability to bring a civil action under federal law is not limited because
“[a] failure to successfully register does not disturb existing state or federal
[common law] rights in a [trade]mark.”20 The fact that a federal law remedy
exists for a common-law trademark supports the pyramid model and the idea
that common-law trademarks and federal trademarks are intertwined.
However, in contrast, the fact that there is the ability to choose between state
15. Id. at 659–60.
16. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3.
17. Hyman et al., supra note 7, at 659.
18. About Trademark Infringement, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademarkinfringement [https://perma.cc/3LKD-A4ZZ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
19. Trademark
Infringement,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark_infringement [https://perma.cc/7Y3Q-LYD2] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019).
20. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3.
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law and federal law supports the box model and the idea that common-law
trademarks and federal trademarks are separate and distinct.
II. THE CONVERSE, INC. V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION DECISION
Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission is a recent example of
the conflict between the pyramid model and the box model. The ITC decided
that trademarks and trademark rights follow the box model.21 However, the
Federal Circuit decided that trademarks and trademark rights follow the
pyramid model.22
A. Converse and the International Trade Commission
It all started with a trademark: U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4,398,753
(“Converse’s federal trademark”).23 Converse’s federal trademark was issued
on September 10, 2013.24
[Converse’s federal trademark] . . . describes the trade-dress
configuration of three design elements on the midsole of Converse’s
[Chuck Taylor] All Star shoes. In particular, as described in the
registration, ‘[Converse’s federal] [trade]mark consists of the design of
the two stripes on the midsole of the shoe, the design of toe cap, the
design of the multi-layered toe bumper featuring diamonds and line
patterns, and the relative position of these elements to each other.’25
Converse’s federal trademark is depicted below.26

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1115.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id. at 1113–14.
Id. at 1114.
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Fast forward approximately one year to the starting point of “one of the
most hotly-litigated trademark cases ever.”27 On October 14, 2014, Converse
filed a lawsuit with the ITC.28 In its complaint, Converse “alleg[ed] violations
of section 337 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] by various respondents in the
importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within
the United States after importation of shoes that infringe on its trademark.”29
The ITC initiated an investigation on November 17, 2014.30 Even though
some of the respondents defaulted, several other respondents that Converse
named in its complaint (the “intervenors”) “appeared and actively participated
in the ITC proceedings, asserting that the accused products did not infringe . . .
[Converse’s federal trademark] and that, in any event, [Converse’s federal
trademark] was invalid.”31
One of the critical issues contested by the parties was whether Converse’s
federal trademark had acquired secondary meaning.32 Converse argued that
Converse had used the three design elements in Converse’s federal trademark
since 1932, and therefore, Converse had established secondary meaning.33
However, the intervenors argued that Converse had not established secondary
meaning because the use of Converse’s federal trademark had not been
“substantially exclusive.”34 Moreover, to further support their argument that
27. Converse Scores a Win in “One of the Most Hotly-Litigated Trademark Cases Ever,” THE
FASHION LAW (Oct. 30, 2018), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/in-front-of-the-federal-circuitconverse-scores-a-win-in-highly-watched-chuck-taylor-case [https://perma.cc/8PT2-YPD4].
28. Converse, 909 F.3d at 1114.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

SUBART 1_21_20 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

FEDERAL AND COMMON-LAW TRADEMARKS

1/28/20 1:28 PM

221

Converse’s federal trademark lacked secondary meaning, the intervenors
offered the Butler survey to show that consumers did not associate Converse’s
federal trademark with a single source.35 Converse and the intervenors also
disputed trademark infringement.36 The ITC and the ITC Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) “treated Converse as claiming two separate [trade]marks[:] a
common-law [trade]mark and a [federal] [trade]mark.”37 Thus, the ITC and
ITC ALJ decided to go with the box model.
The ITC ALJ issued an initial determination on November 17, 2015.38 The
ITC ALJ “[found] violations of section 337 by the intervenors because . . .
[Converse’s federal] trademark was infringed and not invalid, relying on the
presumption of secondary meaning afforded to . . . [Converse’s federal]
[trade]mark.”39 The ITC ALJ determined that Converse’s common-law
trademark had not acquired secondary meaning, “[]but that, if protectable, the
common-law [trade]mark was infringed[].”40
Converse, the intervenors, and the ITC staff petitioned to have the initial
determination reviewed.41 The ITC issued a final determination on June 23,
2016.42 The ITC made determinations for both Converse’s common-law
trademark and Converse’s federal trademark.43 First, for Converse’s commonlaw trademark, “the ITC affirmed the [ITC] ALJ’s finding that . . . [Converse’s
common-law] [trade]mark had not acquired secondary meaning.”44 Second,
for Converse’s federal trademark, “[t]he ITC reversed the [ITC] ALJ’s finding
of no invalidity . . . . The ITC found . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark
invalid in light of its determination that . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark
had not acquired secondary meaning.”45 Furthermore, “[t]he ITC determined
that, if either trademark was not invalid or protectable, it was infringed,
affirming the [ITC] ALJ’s finding in this respect.”46
The ITC did not enter an exclusion order in regard to the intervenors or any
of the other respondents.47 Converse appealed to the Federal Circuit.48
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114–15.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission ensued.
B. Converse and the Federal Circuit
On October 30, 2018, the Federal Circuit determined the fate of Converse’s
common-law trademark and federal trademark in Converse, Inc. v.
International Trade Commission.49 A divided Federal Circuit “conclude[d] that
the ITC made a series of errors that require[d] a remand.”50 The Federal Circuit
separated its opinion into three parts to address these errors.51 In Part I, the
Federal Circuit “discuss[ed] the relevant date for assessing secondary meaning,
the significance of Converse’s trademark registration, and the benefits arising
from that registration.”52 In Part II, the Federal Circuit “define[d] the factors to
be weighed in determining whether a [trade]mark has acquired secondary
meaning.”53 In Part III, the Federal Circuit “address[ed] the standard for
evaluating likelihood of confusion for the purposes of determining [trademark]
infringement.”54
In Part I, the Federal Circuit began by stating that “it is confusing and
inaccurate to refer to two separate [trade]marks[:] a [federal] [trade]mark and a
common-law [trade]mark.”55 According to the Federal Circuit, trademarks and
trademark rights are characterized according to the pyramid model because
“[Converse has] a single [trade]mark, as to which different rights attach from
the common law and from federal registration.”56 The Federal Circuit provided
four citations to support its proposition that Converse possessed only one
trademark: (1) In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.,57 (2) In re
Deister Concentrator Co.,58 (3) McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition,59 and (4) Matal v. Tam.60 The Federal Circuit did some simple
math: Converse’s common-law trademark plus Converse’s federal trademark
equals Converse’s trademark.61
With this crucial determination out of the way, the Federal Circuit next
49.
note 27.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Converse Scores a Win in “One of the Most Hotly–Litigated Trademark Cases Ever,” supra
Converse, 909 F.3d at 1115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1115–16.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
See generally id. at 1115.
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outlined the prima facie case for trademark infringement, and it explained two
ways in which a trademark can be distinctive.62 The Federal Circuit stated that
since Converse was attempting to protect product design, it must show that its
trademark had acquired secondary meaning.63 However, “[t]he ITC’s decision
never determined the relevant date for assessing the existence of secondary
meaning.”64 The Federal Circuit proceeded to analyze the appropriate date for
determining secondary meaning.65
In Part I, the Federal Circuit concluded that “Converse’s registration
confer[red] a presumption of secondary meaning beginning only as of the date
of registration and confer[red] no presumption of secondary meaning before the
date of registration.”66 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that “with respect to
infringement by those respondents whose first uses came before the registration
(including all of the intervenors), Converse must establish[,] without the benefit
of the presumption[,] that its [trade]mark had acquired secondary meaning
before the first infringing use by each respondent.”67 The Federal Circuit
directed the ITC to use this correct, relevant date on remand.68
While the ITC weighed seven factors for determining whether Converse’s
federal trademark acquired secondary meaning, in Part II of the opinion, the
Federal Circuit determined that only six factors were necessary for the
secondary meaning assessment.69 For the Federal Circuit’s secondary meaning
test, the factors to consider include:
(1) association of the trade dress with a particular source by actual
purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys); (2) length,
degree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising;
(4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) intentional copying;
and (6) unsolicited media coverage of the product embodying the
[trade]mark.70
Further, after outlining the appropriate secondary meaning test, the Federal
Circuit delved into a discussion of the particularities of some of the factors.71

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1116–17.
Id. at 1118.
Id.
See id. at 1119.
Id. at 1119–20.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1120–23.
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The Federal Circuit instructed the ITC to use the six-factor test on remand.72
Finally, in Part III of the opinion, the Federal Circuit outlined the
appropriate likelihood-of-confusion analysis for trademark infringement.73 The
Federal Circuit directed the ITC to “determine whether [the accused products]
are substantially similar to [Converse’s] [trade]mark” when it undertakes the
trademark infringement analysis on remand.74
While the pyramid model prevailed in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission, the box model does not go ignored. The box model has its day in
court with Judge O’Malley’s concurrence in part and dissent in part.75 Judge
O’Malley cited four reasons to support her opinion “that the majority was
correct in vacating the ITC’s decision but that it had addressed issues not
properly before it, with respect to the validity and infringement analyses.”76
Specifically, [Judge O’Malley] believe[d] that the majority: (1)
misperceive[d] the scope of the ITC’s authority to invalidate duly
issued intellectual property rights when it addresses the issue of the
validity of a [federal] [trade]mark; (2) blur[red] the line between the
concepts of priority of use under common law and the validity of a
[federal] [trade]mark; (3) espouse[d] advisory—and unnecessary—
opinions on the weight to be given certain survey evidence and the
question of infringement; and (4) ignore[d] the ITC’s statutory
obligation to enter remedies against defaulting parties.77
Judge O’Malley’s second point is most relevant to this Comment.
According to Judge O’Malley, “the relevant and only question” before the court
involved Converse’s common-law trademark.78 “[T]he majority goes on to
assess the validity of . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark even though no
respondents remain for whom . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark is
relevant.”79 It appears that Judge O’Malley supported the use of the box model
and believed, as the ITC did, that Converse possessed two separate trademarks.
Both trademark models make an appearance in the Converse, Inc. v.
International Trade Commission opinion, but the question remains: did the
Federal Circuit select the correct trademark model?

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
See id. at 1127.
Trademark/Trade Dress Infringement, 31 NO. 3 BUS. TORTS REP. 66 (2019).
Converse, 909 F.3d at 1127–28.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
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III. TRADEMARK DECISIONS COMPARISON
The Federal Circuit, in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,
touched on important aspects of trademark law and provided crucial
clarifications. Most importantly, the Federal Circuit determined that
trademarks and trademark rights follow the pyramid model rather than the box
model. The substantive portions of the Converse, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission opinion turned on the Federal Circuit’s determination that
trademarks and trademark rights function under the pyramid model.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court supports the Federal Circuit’s use of the
pyramid model. In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. and Matal v.
Tam, two cases cited in the Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission
opinion, are examples of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court applying
and upholding the pyramid model. For both cases, background and procedural
history are provided for context. The relevant portions of the opinions that are
cited by the Federal Circuit in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission are then outlined.
A. Federal Circuit Case: In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.
International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”) manufactured and
marketed flavor and fragrance essences for a variety of uses.80 In 1994, IFF
filed three trademark applications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(the “USPTO”) for “LIVING XXXX FLAVORS,”81 “LIVING XXXX
FLAVOR,”82 and “LIVING XXXX.”83 The XXXX served as a placeholder for
specific herbs,84 fruits,85 plants,86 vegetables,87 botanicals,88 and botanical
extracts.89
The registrations for the trademarks were initially rejected by the
examining attorney “because the specimens did not match the [trade]marks
depicted in the specimens, i.e., the specimens did not have an ‘XXXX’

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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element.”90
IFF “entered disclaimers for the terms ‘FLAVOR’ and
‘FLAVORS’ and amended the applications to add that ‘the “XXXX”
designations are themselves not part of the [trade]mark.’”91 However, a final
rejection was issued, and the registration for the trademarks was denied.92
IFF appealed to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (the “TTAB”).93 In its opinion, the key issue, as identified by
the TTAB, was that IFF was attempting “to protect, in three registrations[,] . . .
an unknown number of [trade]marks.”94 “The [TTAB] concluded that anyone
conducting a search of IFF’s phantom [trade]mark would be unable to
determine the entire scope covered by such [trade]marks and would be unable
to ascertain the designation used to identify and distinguish the goods covered
by the [trade]mark.”95 The TTAB agreed with the examining attorney’s initial
determination and “affirmed . . . [the] final rejection of [the trademark
registration] applications.”96 IFF appealed the TTAB’s decision to the Federal
Circuit.97 The Federal Circuit upheld the TTAB’s decision.98
In addition to identifying that a trademark application may only be used to
register for one trademark, the Federal Circuit explained the relationship
between common-law trademarks and federal trademarks.99 First, the Federal
Circuit noted that “[t]he federal registration of a trademark does not create an
exclusive property right in the [trade]mark.”100 “The owner of the [trade]mark
already has the property right established by prior use.”101 Trademarks
“identif[y] and distinguish[] the owner’s goods from others. It also signifies
the source and quality of the goods. These attributes are not established or
granted by federal registration of the [trade]mark.”102 A trademark owner
“need not register his or her [trade]mark in accordance with the Lanham Act in
order to use the [trade]mark in connection with goods or to seek to prevent
others from using the [trade]mark.”103 “However, those trademark owners who
register their [trade]marks with the [USPTO] are afforded additional protection
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1364–65.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not provided by the common law.”104
The Federal Circuit continued its opinion by outlining the benefits of
federal registration. The Federal Circuit noted that the purpose of
implementing a federal trademark registration scheme was to build upon
common law rights.105
[T]he Lanham Act provides a federal[] . . . trademark owner a
forum in federal court in which to adjudicate infringement
claims, . . . and it allows, in certain cases, a registrant whose
[trade]mark has been infringed to seek costs, treble damages,
[and] attorney fees . . . ; the destruction of infringing articles
. . . ; and the ability to prevent the importation of infringing
goods . . . .106
Federal registration serves the interests of the registrants, other participants
in the market place such as entrepreneurs, and consumers.107 “Federal
registration provides a useful means for the public to provide enhanced legal
protections to a common law property right in exchange for protection of the
public against palming off and misrepresentation in the market place.”108 Based
on the reasoning included in the opinion, it is clear that the Federal Circuit
relied on the pyramid model rather than the box model.
B. Supreme Court Decision: Matal v. Tam
In Matal v. Tam, Simon Tam, lead singer of The Slants, sought to register
the band’s name under federal trademark law.109 The USPTO denied the
application based on a provision in the Lanham Act “prohibiting the registration
of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute’
any ‘persons, living or dead.’”110 “Tam contested the denial of registration
through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case
to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the
disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause.”111 The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Circuit’s

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1366–67.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1368.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017).
Id. at 1751.
Id. at 1747.
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determination.112
Before delving into the merits of the denied application, the Supreme Court
discussed the fundamentals of trademarks, including a comparison between
common-law trademarks and federal trademarks.113 To begin, the Supreme
Court stated that “[f]ederal law does not create trademarks.”114 “Trademarks
and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at
common law and in equity at the time of the founding of [the United States].”115
Trademark law became the purview of the federal government with the passage
of the Lanham Act in 1946.116 “This system of federal registration [as outlined
in the Lanham Act] helps to ensure that trademarks are fully protected and
supports the free flow of commerce.”117 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
reiterated that “[n]ational protection of trademarks is desirable . . . because
trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to
the producer the benefits of good reputation.”118
Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that valid trademarks do not
require federal registration to be used in commerce.119 In addition to the
protection of state trademark law, common-law trademarks fall under the
purview of federal trademark law in two important instances.120 First, “even if
a trademark is not federally registered, it may still be enforceable under § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, which creates a federal cause of action for trademark
infringement.”121 Second, “[common-law] trademarks may also be entitled to
protection under other federal statutes, such as the Anticybersquautting
Consumer Protection Act . . . .”122 The Supreme Court also discussed the
protection of common-law trademarks at the state level.123 The Supreme Court
recognized that federal registration builds upon the foundation established by
common law rights, stating that “[f]ederal registration . . . ‘confers important
legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their

112. Id. at 1751.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1752.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 531 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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[trade]marks.’”124 Based on the reasoning included in the opinion, the Supreme
Court was clearly advocating for the pyramid model rather than the box model.
C. But What About the Box Model?
In Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit
provides a snapshot of the trademark cases that follow the pyramid model,
briefly discussing four citations to other sources of authority,125 to support its
decision to apply the pyramid model. The Federal Circuit only scratches the
surface; there are many more trademark law cases that discuss the pyramid
model. However, there does not appear to be any Federal Circuit or Supreme
Court majority opinions that rely on the box model. This lack of support for
the box model bolsters the argument that the Federal Circuit got it right in
Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.
IV. PRAISE FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The Federal Circuit correctly selected the pyramid model. The ITC errored
in applying the box model to distinguish Converse’s common-law trademark
from Converse’s federal trademark. Converse does not have a common-law
trademark and a federal trademark. Rather, Converse has a single trademark
that has common law rights and federal registration rights. Converse has a main
trademark with a common law trademark portion and a federal trademark
portion. Converse has a pyramid with two levels. Common law rights and
federal registration rights build upon one another. Federal registration rights
support common law rights by providing additional safeguards; federal
registration rights do not supplant common law rights.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit maintained an important trademark tradition
and precedent with its decision in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission. Even though the field of trademarks continuously evolves, the
underlying principles do not. The pyramid model is a better representation of
these underlying principles than the box model. It is unclear as to why the ITC
decided to apply the box model because the ITC ALJ did not provide any
support for that determination. The ITC ALJ stated that the box model applied
and moved on with the rest of the analysis without further reasoning.
Regardless of the lack of reasoning by the ITC ALJ, the Federal Circuit
recognized the error and quickly corrected course. Furthermore, it is important
to recognize that cases prior to Converse, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission maintained the same foundational aspects of trademark law by
applying the pyramid model. If there were an issue with viewing trademarks
124. Id. at 1753.
125. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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and trademark rights under the pyramid model, there would be a discrepancy
between Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission and prior case law.
However, there is no discrepancy here.
It is not contrary to the fundamental principles of trademark law to think of
trademarks and trademark rights as a pyramid. The essence of trademarks is
interdependence. The product relies on the trademark as a source of
identification. The product relies on the use of the trademark in commerce to
attach common law rights. The consumer relies on the trademark as a way to
distinguish one product from another. Federal registration rights rely on
common law rights. Therefore, it makes sense that there is a single trademark.
Trademark rights exist as a pyramid with federal registration rights building
upon common law rights. The pyramid model is the way to go.
CONCLUSION
In Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit
provided further clarification on the issue of whether common-law trademarks
are distinguishable from federal trademarks. The Federal Circuit correctly
answered this question by applying the pyramid model. Trademarks should be
viewed under the context of the pyramid model. A trademark constitutes one
pyramid, composed of two levels that define the sub-trademarks and associated
rights. Level 1 contains the common-law trademark portion and common law
rights, and Level 2 houses the federal trademark portion and federal registration
rights. This crucial determination—that trademarks and trademark rights work
like a pyramid—impacted the remaining portions of the Converse, Inc. v.
International Trade Commission opinion. Although the Federal Circuit did not
devote many words to the determination that the pyramid model applies, the
importance of viewing trademark law under the pyramid model cannot be
underscored. It is clear that the Federal Circuit took one out of Converse’s
playbook: do not mess with a classic. Just as the Converse All-Star shoe is a
classic in the universe of consumer goods, fundamental trademark principles
and the pyramid model are classics in the universe of intellectual property law.

